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Abstract
We develop a fully Bayesian, computationally efficient framework for incorporating
model uncertainty into Type II Tobit models and apply this to the investigation of the
determinants of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). While direct evaluation of model
probabilities is intractable in this setting, we show that by using conditional Bayes
Factors, which nest model moves inside a Gibbs sampler, we are able to incorporate
model uncertainty in a straight-forward fashion. We conclude with a study of global
FDI flows between 1988-2000.
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1 Introduction
We consider modeling the determinants of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and incorporat-
ing model uncertainty in this framework. FDI flows are important for several reasons. For
one, they can be taken as a measure of growing economic globalization. Every time a firm
sets up a new subsidiary in a different country they engage in FDI. And every positive FDI
flow increases the FDI stock in a certain country. The size of the FDI stock shows how much
this country is integrated into the international market, because FDI usually comes with a
considerable amount of trade as one third of world trade is intrafirm (Navaretti and Ven-
ables, 2006). Also, FDI may have a positive effect on the host country’s economy. Countries
may hope for increasing employment and other positive effects like technological spill-over,
educational effects on the labor force and of course increasing tax income. While tradition-
ally most FDI occurs between the developed countries, developing countries have growing
FDI inflows and this trend is not expected to change.
We consider bilateral FDI inflows from the years 1988-2000 and model the decision to
engage in foreign direct investment which includes the decisions of how much to invest and
whether to invest at all. The two-stage nature of FDI decisions disqualifies the use of simple
linear regression and requires a statistical approach that accounts for sample selection. One
framework that may be used is the generalized Tobit model, a two-equation linear regression
model.
An additional statistical complication arises from the complexity of the FDI decision
process. This leads to a profusion of economic theories and concomitant model uncertainty
which we address through Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA). The specifics of Tobit estima-
tion in a Bayesian context make direct model comparison difficult, due to the inability to
resolve nested sets of integrals. In a pervious study (Eicher et al., 2011) of FDI determinants,
this issue was addressed through the use of BIC approximations in a framework based on
Heckit estimation. While the method was useful at illuminating important FDI determi-
nants, it stood on tenuous ground theoretically. The variable inclusion probabilities were
approximations and the entire modeling framework was not strictly Bayesian. We resolve
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these issues in the developments below.
We show that by nesting model moves inside a larger Gibbs sampler, we are able to com-
pute conditional Bayes Factors (CBFs) directly and easily. This leads to a procedure that
simultaneously addresses selection bias and model uncertainty and does so with limited addi-
tional computational complications. CBFs were originally introduced by Dickey and Gunel
(1978) and recently proposed in a related econometric setting by Karl and Lenkoski (2012).
Our new method, which we call Tobit Bayesian Model Averaging (TBMA), thus combines
CBFs with Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) estimation to yield a fully theoretically
valid methodology that is also computationally much more efficient than the procedure de-
veloped in Eicher et al. (2011).
We conclude with an analysis of the data provided in Eicher et al. (2011). We show
that our new method yields broadly similar conclusions as that of Eicher et al. (2011), in
the determinants of the amount of FDI. However, the two methods differ substantially in
the selection equation. This is attributed to the fact that the HeckitBMA method of Eicher
et al. (2011) did not “feed back” information from the outcome equation into the model
probabilities of the selection equation. Our method, by contrast, updates the two model
spaces in a joint fashion, which is more grounded in Bayesian theory. Futher, the method
requires only a fraction of the computing time taken by Eicher et al. (2011), due to the
efficiency of the CBF calculations.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 will review the Type II Tobit model and
discuss the Bayesian estimation of its parameters. Section 3 will build on these develop-
ments to introduce the TBMA algorithm that incorporates model uncertainty. Section 4
will comprise our main data analysis of FDI determinants. In Section 5 we conclude.
2 Review of the Tobit model
FDI flow data contain a large number of 0’s, resulting from an issue of sample selection
(Eicher et al., 2011). In order to avoid selection bias we use the generalized Tobit model,
also known as Type II Tobit model or sample selection model. The bias in the OLS estimate
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arises when manually selecting observations (i.e. only use observations with a positive FDI
flow). This problem can be solved by using a system of two equations with a selection and an
outcome equation thus putting the selection of observations into a probabilistic framework.
The generalized Tobit model for i ∈ {1, 2, ..., n} is given by
zi = w
′
iθ + i (1)
y∗i = x
′
iβ + ηi (2)
yi = y
∗
i 1(zi ≥ 0).
Above, yi is the observed dependent variable and y
∗
i its uncensored factor. zi is a latent
variable that determines whether yi is observed and wi, xi are independent p× 1 and q × 1
variable vectors with corresponding coefficient vectors θ, β. Relating to the modeling of
foreign direct investment, yi is the log FDI flow from one country to another (only one
direction) and xi contains the covariates which are believed to influence the magnitude of
FDI flows. The vector wi consists of the covariates that influence the initial decision whether
to engage in FDI.
It is reasonable to assume that these two vectors share some covariates. Corruption, for
example, could deter firms because of ethical reasons or fear of legal punishment, while the
higher cost of doing business could decrease the amount of investment. But the covariate
vectors could also be entirely different.
We assume correlation between the selection and outcome process and therefore the error
term is jointly distributed (i, ηi)
′ ∼i.i.d. N (0,Σ) with covariance matrix
Σ =
1 γ
γ φ+ γ2
 . (3)
The entry Σ11 can be set to 1 for identification because zi is an unobserved latent variable
and only its sign is of relevance (McCulloch et al., 2000).
2.1 Bayesian Posterior Determination
In order to determine the posterior distribution of the parameters in (1)-(3) we follow the
Gibbs sampler outlined in Omori (2007). This returns a dependent sample whose distribu-
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tion resembles that of θ,β, γ, φ|z,y where z = (z1, ..., zn)′ and y = (y1, ..., yn)′ .
As z is a latent variable and cannot be observed, it will be generated using data aug-
mentation (Albert and Chib, 1993). Early Bayesian approaches to Tobit estimation also
imputed the censored observations in y. This however is inefficient (Chib, 2007) and Omori
(2007) outlines a Gibbs sampler based on the marginalization of the posterior distribution
over censored observations.
Let yo denote the vector of uncensored observations. We define the following prior dis-
tributions
θ ∼ N (θ0,Θ0) β ∼ N (β0,B0) γ ∼ N (γ0, G0) φ ∼ IG
(
s0
2
, S0
2
)
, (4)
where IG denotes the inverse gamma distribution. This yields the following joint posterior
probability density
pr(z,θ,β, γ, φ|yo) ∝ pr(z,yo|θ,β, γ, φ) pr(θ) pr(β) pr(γ) pr(φ),
where
pr(z,yo|θ,β, γ, φ)
∝ φ−no/2 exp
(
− 1
2
[ ∑
i|zi<0
(zi −w′iθ)2
+
∑
i|zi≥0
(1 + γ
2
φ
)(zi −w′iθ)2 − 2γφ(zi −w
′
iθ)(yi − x
′
iβ) +
1
φ
(yi − x′iβ)2
])
and no is the number of uncensored observations. The conditional posterior distributions of
ψ = (θ
′
,β
′
)
′
, γ and φ are then given by
ψ|z,yo, γ, φ ∼ N (ψ1,Ψ1)
γ|z,yo,ψ, φ ∼ N (γ1, G1)
φ|z,yo,ψ, γ ∼ IG
(
s1
2
, S1
2
)
.
(5)
A detailed description of the parameters is given in Appendix A.
The conditional distributions used to sample the latent variables zi have the form of
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normal distributions truncated at zero. A censored observation corresponds to a negative
value of zi, whereas for an uncensored observation to occur it must be positive. Due to
marginalization over the censored observations, the way in which mean and variance are
calculated depends on whether the observation is censored (see Appendix A).
3 Incorporating Model Uncertainty
In the case of FDI, model uncertainty means uncertainty about which FDI determinants have
an influence on the actual FDI flows and thus which economic theories can be supported.
The two equations in the Tobit model represent different types of influence. Inclusion of a
determinant in the selection equation means it has an influence on the decision whether to
invest at all, while inclusion in the outcome equation suggests influence on the magnitude of
the actual FDI flow.
In order to explain the motivation behind our CBF approach, we first review some basic
results from classic BMA literature. We then show how the concept of Bayes Factors can
be usefully embedded in a Gibbs sampler yielding CBFs. These CBFs are then shown to
yield straightforward calculations. The section concludes with an overview of the full TBMA
procedure.
3.1 Bayes Factors
In a general framework, incorporating model uncertainty involves considering a collection of
candidate models I, using the data D. Each model I consists of a collection of probability
distributions for the data D, {pr(D|ξ), ξ ∈ ΞI} where ΞI denotes the parameter space for
the parameters of model I and is a subset of the full parameter space Ξ.
By letting the model become an additional parameter to be assessed in the posterior, we
aim to calculate the posterior model probabilities given the data D. By Bayes’ rule
pr(I|D) = pr(D|I)pr(I)∑
I′∈I pr(D|I ′)pr(I ′)
, (6)
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where pr(I), denotes the prior probability for model I ∈ I.
The integrated likelihood pr(D|I), is defined by
pr(D|I) =
∫
ΞI
pr(D|ξ)pr(ξ|I)dξ, (7)
where pr(ξ|I) is the prior for ξ under model I, which by definition has all its mass on ΞI .
One possibility for pairwise comparison of models is offered by the Bayes factor (BF),
which is in most cases defined together with the posterior odds (Kass and Raftery, 1995).
The posterior odds of model I versus model I ′ is given by
pr(I|D)
pr(I ′|D) =
pr(D|I)
pr(D|I ′)
pr(I)
pr(I ′)
,
where
pr(D|I)
pr(D|I ′) and
pr(I)
pr(I ′)
denote the Bayes factor and the prior odds of I versus I ′, respectively.
When the integrated likelihood (7) and thus the BF can be computed directly, a straight-
forward method for exploring the model space, Markov Chain Monte Carlo Model Compo-
sition (MC3), was developed by Madigan and York (1995).
MC3 determines posterior model probabilities by generating a stochastic process that
moves through the model space I and has equilibrium distribution pr(I|D). Given the cur-
rent state I(s), MC3 proposes a new model I ′ according to a proposal distribution q(·|·),
calculates
α =
pr(D|I ′)pr(I ′)q(I(s)|I ′)
pr(D|I(s))pr(I(s))q(I ′|I(s))
and sets I(s+1) = I ′ with probability min{α, 1} otherwise setting I(s+1) = I(s).
3.2 Conditional Bayes Factors
For the model space of the Tobit model we will be using the Cartesian product of two model
spaces, one for each equation. Let I be the model space for the selection equation and L
the model space for the outcome equation. Each model Ii ∈ I and Lj ∈ L defines which
covariates shall be used in their respective equation and the entirety of models M = I × L
7
covers all possible combinations of covariates for both equations. A model M ∈ M can
be interpreted as a specific selection of restrictions ΨM on the vector ψ. The entry in the
parameter vector will be set to 0 if the corresponding covariate should not be included in
the estimation according to the model in question.
As discussed above, two competing models could be compared by computing
pr(D|M) =
∫
Σ
∫
ψ∈ΨM
pr(D|ψ,Σ)pr(ψ|M)pr(Σ)dψdΣ
Unfortunately, this factor, has no obvious, analytic form. Instead, we focus on the conditional
Bayes Factor (CBF),
pr(D|Mij,Σ) =
∫
pr(D|Mij, ψ,Σ) pr(ψ|Mij,Σ)dψ,
The CBF thus calculates the integrated likelihood conditional on a fixed setting of Σ. In
appendix B we show that
pr(D|M,Σ) ∝ |Ψ1,M |
1/2
|Ψ0,M |1/2
exp(−1
2
ψ
′
0,MΨ
−1
0,Mψ0,M)
exp(−1
2
ψ
′
1,MΨ
−1
1,Mψ1,M)
, (8)
where ψ0,M , ψ1,M ,Ψ0,M and Ψ1,M are exactly analogous to the paramters discussed in Sec-
tion 2 but restricted to the subset of variables contained in model M . We see that the
expression (8) is quite straightforward to calculate and essentially only requires the param-
eters necessary in the Gibbs sampler.
We feel a comment on the implication of equation (8) is in order. Remember that for
linear regression BIC is calculated as
BICM = n log(1−R2M) + pM log n
where n is the sample size, R2M is the value of R
2 for the model M and pM is the number of
parameters included (Raftery, 1995). Assuming a flat prior distribution on the model space
we can use BIC to approximate the posterior model probability
pr(M |D) ≈ exp(−1
2
BICM) ≈ 1
npM/2
exp(n
2
R2M)
where c is a normalizing constant. The last part of the equation can be interpreted as the
product of a term penalizing for model complexity and a term measuring the goodness of fit.
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We note that (8) can be interpreted in the same manner. The second part of the product in
(8) can be rewritten as
exp(−1
2
ψ
′
0,ijΨ
−1
0,ijψ0,ij)
exp(−1
2
ψ
′
1,ijΨ
−1
1,ijψ1,ij)
∝
exp
(
− 1
2
[ ∑
n|zn<0
(y˜n − X˜nψ1,ij)′(y˜n − X˜nψ1,ij)
+
∑
n|zn≥0
(y˜n − X˜nψ1,ij)′Σ−1(y˜n − X˜nψ1,ij)
+ (ψ0,ij −ψ1,ij)′Ψ−10,ij(ψ0,ij −ψ1,ij)
])
,
where y˜n is a two-dimensional vector of the latent and dependent variable and X˜n is a
2× (p+ q) matrix of covariates (see Appendix A for the definitions). Essentially, this is the
residual sum of squares for the decorelated and normalized equations of the Tobit model as
the argument of a strictly decreasing function. A decrease in the residual sum of squares,
or increase in goodness of fit, leads to a greater integrated likelihood. The ratio containing
the prior and posterior covariance matrix penalizes for increasing model complexity. We
therefore see that (8) has a strong relationship to the calculation of BIC, and yet relies on
no approximations.
3.3 Tobit Bayesian Model Averaging (TBMA)
We now review the entire TBMA algorithm that integrates MC3 into the Gibbs sampler using
CBFs. We assume a flat prior on the model space (i.e. pr(M) ∝ 1), although other prior
distributions could be readily accommodated. For a detailed description of the parameters
see Appendix A.
1. Initialize ψ, γ and φ.
2. Sample z|yo,ψ, γ, φ.
• For censored observations: zi|M,ψ, γ, φ ∼ N(−∞,0)(w′iθ, 1).
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• For uncensored observations: zi|yi,M,ψ, γ, φ ∼ N[0,∞)(µi, σ2i ).
3. Sample γ|M, z,yo,ψ, φ ∼ N (γ1, G1).
4. Sample φ|M, z,yo,ψ, γ ∼ IG
(
s1
2
, S1
2
)
.
5. Apply modified MC3.
(a) Sample M ′ from the neighborhood of M .
(b) Compute pr(D|M ′, γ, φ) and pr(D|M,γ, φ) as in equation (8).
(c) Accept M ′ as new M with probability min {1,CBFM ′M}.
6. Sample ψ|M, z,yo, γ, φ ∼ N (ψ1,Ψ1).
7. Go to 2.
By adding one single step to the existing Gibbs sampler we are able to include model un-
certainty. Furthermore, it is a very efficient way since the calculations for the parameters of
the conditional posterior distribution of ψ are included in step 5.
4 Application to FDI Data
4.1 Economic theories and associated FDI determinants
Every investor considering FDI is confronted with a two-stage decision. Whether he should
make an investment abroad and if so, how much he should invest. Even though later on we
will be looking at aggregate FDI flows derived from the balances of payments of different
countries, these decisions are made at the firm level. Naturally, firm-level data would be the
best basis for inference but they are almost impossible to come by.
Probably the most important principle in the theoretic work on FDI is the OLI frame-
work by Dunning (1980). The OLI principle states that firms decide to engage in FDI if they
have ownership of goods or production processes that give them market power, if they can
benefit from having a plant in a foreign location rather than at home and if internalization
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of the foreign activity provides an advantage over contracts with local firms. Ownership
and location-specific advantages are reasons why firms would want to produce in a foreign
country in the first place, and internalization is a way to protect your assets in face of market
failures. Every time assets are revealed there is a risk of dissipation which would result in a
loss of value. This concern may lead to difficulties in negotiations for rents of a certain asset.
Firms would not want to reveal the full asset before a contract is finalized while the potential
local partner is not ready to pay the full price until the asset has been fully revealed. Even
after a contract is finalized, there is the risk of hold-up situations when the local partner had
to make investments in relationship-specific goods. Due to incomplete contracts, there is a
possibility of renegotiations where the local partner has little bargaining power. These ne-
gotiation difficulties can make a firm internalize their production by engaging in FDI rather
than signing contracts with local firms.
Early analytical FDI theory based on the OLI principle suggested two distinct motiva-
tions for FDI, horizontal and vertical FDI (Markusen, 1984; Helpman, 1984). Horizontal
FDI (HFDI) is undertaken when firms want to access different markets. Instead of increas-
ing their production at home and exporting produced goods, they invest in production in
the foreign country. It is a way to serve a foreign market by partially duplicating the exist-
ing production. Thus, a similar development level in both host and source country for the
industry in which the firm is operating may increase HFDI. Reasons to engage in HFDI in
the first place include the evasion of trade restrictions and reduction of trade costs which
can be summarized as tariff-jumping FDI. This lowers the marginal costs for the firm and
may lead to strategic advantage over national firms in the foreign market. Vertical FDI
(VFDI), on the other hand, leverages lower factor prices in other economies. For example, a
firm may have an interest to move unskilled labour-intensive activities to countries with low
wages when the trade costs are relatively low as well. Usually firms with easily segmentable
production processes tend to engage in VFDI. These two motivations have been unified into
the knowledge-capital model of FDI (Markusen, 1997). Determinants suggested by these
theories are trade costs, educational differences and market size. Note that aggregated FDI
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flows are currently still dominated by horizontal FDI which is closely related to the fact that
most FDI flows take place between developed countries.
Developed countries also often engage in trade or investment agreements, which are designed
to facilitate these international transactions. The question related to these agreements is
whether they do have the positive impact they are supposed to have and in the case of
trade agreements how they affect FDI. Liberalization of trade may have a negative effect
when trade and FDI are substitutes, as in HFDI theory, but trading can lead to a higher
GDP, which means a greater market size, and that is generally thought to have a positive
impact on FDI. Overall, trade agreements are expected to positively influence FDI since a
large portion of world trade is intra-firm. Another means of facilitation of both trade and
investment are currency unions and these as such should not be expected to have a negative
impact.
Tax treaties and taxation in general, intuitively should have a negative impact on FDI.
However, the empirical results are ambiguous. Taxation reduces the wealth of a firm and
reduces the possibilities of investment but the laws vary strongly between different coun-
tries. Firms may be motivated to evade taxes by strategic investment, which could increase
investment and some countries may try to attract FDI with tax incentives. Tax treaties are
a way for countries to level the playing field, resulting in higher overall tax.
An approach, that is very successful and popular in empirical analysis of FDI, uses grav-
ity equations. Gravity equations have been used for almost half a century to explain ex post
effects of various country characteristics on bilateral trade flows (Bergstrand and Egger,
2007). In physics, we can observe that the gravitational force is poportional to the size of
the physical body and inversely proportional to the square of the distance from the physical
body. This leads to the idea that, as in physics, a greater market size of both host and source
country positively influences trade flows while distance between the two economies has a neg-
ative effect. Only recently, a theoretical foundation for the gravity model in trade flows has
been established (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003; Bergstrand and Egger, 2007). Since
trade decisions are closely related to FDI decisions and FDI may be considered a substitute
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for trade in HFDI theory, the gravity model is a very popular approach in examining FDI
determinants (Navaretti and Venables, 2006). However, it seems as though FDI behavior
is much more complicated to model than trade flows and there is no paper that identifies
gravity variables as the sole determinants of FDI flows (Blonigen, 2005).
One reason why FDI flows are more difficult to model than trade flows could be because
the location of investment is a part of the decision. When national firms are looking to invest
with the intention to export or import, the decision is influenced by potential trade partners
and whether the conditions in the home country encourage further investment. The actual
trade decision is not very sensitive to country characteristics, except those that directly affect
profit. Those may be trade costs that affect the profit margin and market size which has an
influence on the total demand of goods. National firms have to consider only the risks they
take when investing in their home country, whereas multinational firms have to evaluate their
disintegration costs which include all their risks in several different countries. They try to
find the best country for their investment and many country characteristics have a potential
influence on the risk an investor takes when making a long-term investment. These range
from cumbersome regulations to economic or political conditions which in turn may lead to
early withdrawal or even total loss of investment. While accurately measuring the risks is
very difficult, estimation of the effects on FDI should be easier. Since individual analysis
of all countries is too costly even for multinational firms, decisions are often influenced by
indices that try to measure political, legal and economic conditions. The effect of indices or
ratings on financial decisions can clearly be seen in the current debt crisis in Europe. For
FDI, legal protection of assets, corruption and general quality of institutions but also existing
or potential conflicts are only some of the factors measured by indices. If in a certain country,
firms have to fear expropriation or difficulties in the repatriation of profits one should expect
a lower FDI inflow for said country. Corruption increases cost of doing business and in some
cases may be heavily punished (U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act) while weak institutions
may be pressured in face of a change of government. Internal and external conflicts may lead
to unforeseen structural changes and falls in profitability. Internal conflicts can range from
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civil disorder to civil war caused by religious/ethnic tensions or socioeconomic factors like
unemployment or poverty. External conflicts can present themselves in foreign pressures,
like restrictions on operations or trade/investment sanctions, to full-out war.
4.2 Description of the Dataset
We use the same set of data as Eicher et al. (2011) which is an unbalanced panel that covers
the years 1988 - 2000. It contains 803 unique country pairs of 46 countries. 21 of these
countries are not members of the OECD. The total number of observations is 14863 and
64 percent of these observations indicate zero FDI inflow. In addition to the observed FDI
inflows it contains data on 55 potential FDI determinants. The descriptive statistics of the
log FDI flows and all 55 determinants can be found in Table 1.
The dataset is based on Razin et al. (2008) which is the source for the gravity variables
(market size, proxied by the real GDP, and distance), for factor endowments (development
levels, proxied by real GDP per capita, and educational difference), and various other deter-
minants - namely, productivity (real GDP per worker), GDP growth rate, financial risk and
common language. Also, we will be using a variable indicating past FDI flows. Razin et al.
obtained the FDI outflow data from the OECD International Direct Investment Database
(OECD) which is noted in U.S. dollars and deflated it by the U.S. Consumer Price Index.
Market potential has been constructed according to the definition given in Blonigen et al.
(2007).
Eicher and Henn (2011) provided the geographical and historical indicators, border and
colony, but also a list of both multilateral and bilateral trade agreements, as well as currency
union indicators. Another list of bilateral tax treaties has been obtained from Neumeyer and
Spess (2005).
The average effective corporate tax rates have been constructed using the definitions and
information provided in Altshuler et al. (1988), Blonigen and Davies (2004) and the U.S.
Treasury Corporate Tax Files.
Institutional variables and other risk factors have been taken from the International Country
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Risk Guides (ICRG, 2000), where the exact definition of each index can be found. Included
in the dataset are indices of host and source country’s corruption, bureaucratic efficiency
and investment profile, a composite index concerned with contract viability/expropriation,
repatriation of profits and payment delays, but also several political risk indices. These in-
dices proxy the benefits of democratic accountability, government stability and a strong legal
system, but also the risks of military government participation, internal/external conflicts,
ethnic/religious tension and the socioeconomic profile, which includes unemployment and
poverty.
4.3 Results
We ran several chains with 100,000 iterations each, to confirm convergence in the model and
parameter space. As we can see in Figure 1, the running average number of determinants
suggested by TBMA converges relatively quickly and is consistent with different starting
points, for both the selection and the outcome equation. The average percentage of model
jumps is just above 7%. Using TBMA we obtain 19 determinants for the selection equation
and 28 for the outcome equation with an inclusion probability greather than 50%. This is
more than the numbers suggested by HeckitBMA of 13 and 23 but still less than the 23 and
35 determinants of the Heckit model (Eicher et al., 2011).
Table 2 of (Eicher et al., 2011) provides an overview of whether a determinant has been
expected to have a positive, negative or no effect in the past. Table 3 shows TBMA esti-
mates of posterior mean and standard deviation, as well as the inclusion probabilities of each
determinant. The inclusion probability is defined as the ratio of the number of samples to
the length of the chain after discarding the first 10,000 iterations as burn-in period.
We find that TBMA gives support for roughly the same determinants as HeckitBMA
when modeling the magnitude of FDI flows. As expected, the gravity variables host and
source market size as well as distance have a decisive effect on FDI flows. Surprisingly, while
distance has a negative and the source country’s market size has a positive effect, we find
that the market size of the host country influences FDI flows negatively. Of the geographical
15
(a) selection equation (b) outcome equation
Figure 1: Running average numbers of determinants for selection and outcome equation of
2 chains with length 100k.
and historical determinants only a former colonial connection and common language exert
a decisive positive effect on the amount of investment. As with HeckitBMA, the levels of
development are found to be of significance while an effect of educational difference cannot
be supported. A higher effective tax rate of both host and source country negatively influ-
ences FDI. GDP growth in the host country, as well as productivity in the host country are
very likely to have a positive impact, whereas source country GDP growth and productivity
do not seem to be of importance. We also find the same peculiar behavior, that market
potential does seem to have an effect although it is a negative one. The effect of regional
trade agreements, namely APEC and LAIA are supported by both HeckitBMA and TBMA
but only TBMA suggests a significant effect of the EEA. Both methods find a positive im-
pact if the same currency of two countries is the U.S. dollar whereas the EURO seems to
be of little importance, keeping in mind that the examined years range from 1988 to 2000.
Risk proxies supported by both HeckitBMA and TBMA are corruption in host and source
country, religious tension and internal conflicts in the host country and bureaucratic quality
and ethnic tension in the source country. HeckitBMA additionally suggests the investment
profile of the source country while TBMA shows an effect of the socioeconomic conditions
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in host and source country and external conflicts in the host country. All risk proxies from
the International Country Risk Guides are positively oriented, which means we are talking
about lack of tensions and conflicts or quality of conditions.
Looking at the selection equation this unison of HeckitBMA and TBMA seems to fade.
Only five determinants receive high inclusion probabilities from both methods. These deter-
minants are the levels of development and religious tension in the host country, the effective
tax rates in both host and source country and a previous FDI relation. HeckitBMA fur-
ther suggests the regional trade agreements APEC and EFTA, common language, financial
risk in host and source country, religious tension in the source country as well as military
government participation and ethnic tension in the host country as determinants with sig-
nificant effect on the decision whether to enage in FDI. Additional to the five determinants
supported by both methods, TBMA suggests that a former colonial relationship, distance, a
common border, host market size, host and source development levels and a few risk indices
are important for the decision of whether to engage in FDI. These risk indices proxy mainly
source country risks, namely corruption, ethnic tension, the socioeconomic conditions, mili-
tary government participation and external conflicts in the source country and only one host
country risk, strength of the legal system and the obeyance thereof.
These differences in the inclusion probabilities for the selection equation result from the
different ways of estimation. HeckitBMA, as a two-stage estimation method, isolates the
estimations for selection and outcome equation and models the influence of the selection on
the outcome equation with the Inverse Mills Ratio. In TBMA these two estimations are
simultaneous and feedback from the outcome to the selection equation is expected.
5 Conclusions
Dealing with model uncertainty by averaging parameter estimates according to posterior
model probabilities has seen a rise in the last few years. MCMC methods are a very efficient
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way1 to approximate the posterior model probabilities and achieve Bayesian Model Averag-
ing, as models with high posterior model probabilities are evaluated more frequently than
others with low probability. The length of the sum for the averaged parameter estimate
is determined by the length of the Markov chain and not by the total number of models,
which is particularly useful if we have a huge number of models where many of them have
very low probability. While the necessary length of the chain is dependent on the number of
high probability models, MCMC methods help finding these models without the necessity
to calculate the posterior probability for every possible model.
Within the MCMC framework, we found a way to implement Bayesian Model Averaging
for the generalized Tobit model without using approximations, like the BIC, to achieve the
right mixture of models according to the Bayes factors. Maximizing the likelihood and then
penalizing for model complexity under the assumption of infinite observations, as BIC does,
should be avoided especially when data is rare. Within a Gibbs sampler that explores the
parameter space, it is possible to use the MC3 method with conditional Bayes factors. This
way, estimates of the posterior model probabilities are unbiased for any number of observa-
tions, whereas BIC may systematically penalize model complexity too strongly or too weakly
when dealing with a small dataset. While the structure of the conditional likelihood for the
conditional Bayes factor is similar in interpretation to the structure of the posterior model
probability derived from the BIC, it is not necessary to use a flat prior on the model space
for BMA. We can easily modify step 5 in the Tobit Bayesian Model Averaging algorithm
(section 4.1) to include various prior beliefs about model probabilities, according to section
3.4, equation (8).
Since TBMA is fully justified within the Bayesian framework, we expect more accurate
parameter estimates in comparison to other BMA results. Also, other hierarchical compo-
nents, like random effects and time dependencies, can be included more confidently with a
firm ground to rely on. TBMA easily accomodates additional components, as all it takes is
1The whole algorithm, as implemented in section 4.1, takes less than 1 hour of runtime for our dataset
and a chain of length 100k on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i5-2400 CPU @ 3.1GHz, 8GB RAM, Windows 7 SP1
64 Bit system using R x64 2.13.1 (no multicore support).
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another additional Gibbs step, and using the combination of conditional Bayes factors and
MC3 fits perfectly into the MCMC paradigm.
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Appendix A
Parameters for the conditional posterior distribution of zi:
• For censored observations:
µi = w
′
iθ
σ2i = 1
• For uncensored observations:
µi = w
′
iθ +
γ
φ+ γ2
(yi − x′iβ)
σ2i = 1−
γ2
φ+ γ2
Parameters for the conditional posterior distribution of ψ:
ψ1 = Ψ1
Ψ−10 ψ0 + ∑
i|zi≥0
X˜
′
iΣ
−1y˜i +
∑
i|zi<0
X˜
′
iy˜i

Ψ1 =
Ψ−10 + ∑
i|zi≥0
X˜
′
iΣ
−1X˜ i +
∑
i|zi<0
X˜
′
iX˜ i
−1
y˜i =

zi
yi
 if zi ≥ 0
zi
0
 if zi < 0
, X˜ i =

w′i 0′
0
′
x
′
i
 if zi ≥ 0
w′i 0′
0
′
0
′
 if zi < 0
ψ0 =
θ0
β0
 , Ψ0 =
Θ0 0
0 B0

Parameters for the conditional posterior distribution of γ:
γ1 = G1
G−10 γ0 + φ−1 ∑
i|zi≥0
(zi −w′iθ)(yi − x
′
iβ)

G1 =
G−10 + φ−1 ∑
i|zi≥0
(zi −w′iθ)2
−1
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Parameters for the conditional posterior distribution of φ:
s1 = s0 + no
S1 = S0 + γ
2
∑
i|zi≥0
(zi −w′iθ)2 − 2γ
∑
i|zi≥0
(zi −w′iθ)(yi − x
′
iβ) +
∑
i|zi≥0
(yi − x′iβ)2
Appendix B
The covariance structure of the linear regression system is given by the covariance matrix
Σ, which is parameterized by γ and φ (see section 2.1) and a priori independent from the
choice of model Mij ∈M. Restrictions are imposed on the space of the regression parameter
vector ψ = (θ
′
,β
′
)
′
according to the model Mij (see section 3) and the dependence is noted
by ψij. The parameters for the conditional prior normal distribution of ψij are mean ψ0,ij
and covariance matrix Ψ0,ij. For the definition of y˜i and X˜ i, as well as the posterior mean
ψ1,ij and covariance matrix Ψ1,ij see Appendix A.
pr(D|Mij, γ, φ) =
∫
pr(D|Mij,ψij, γ, φ) pr(ψij|Mij)dψij
∝ (2pi)−pij/2 |Ψ0,ij|−1/2∫
exp
(
− 1
2
[ ∑
k|zk≥0
(y˜k − X˜kψij)′Σ−1(y˜k − X˜kψij)
+
∑
k|zk<0
(y˜k − X˜kψij)′(y˜k − X˜kψij)
+ (ψij −ψ0,ij)′Ψ−10,ij(ψij −ψ0,ij)
])
dψij
∝ (2pi)−pij/2 |Ψ0,ij|−1/2 exp(−12ψ′0,ijΨ−10,ijψ0,ij)∫
exp
(
− 1
2
[
− 2
(
ψ′0,ijΨ
−1
0,ij +
∑
k|zk≥0
y˜′kΣ
−1X˜k +
∑
k|zk<0
y˜′kX˜k
)
ψij
+ψ′ij
(
Ψ−10 +
∑
k|zk≥0
X˜ ′kΣ
−1X˜k +
∑
k|zk<0
X˜ ′kX˜k
)
ψij
])
dψij
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= (2pi)−pij/2 |Ψ0,ij|−1/2 exp(−12ψ′0,ijΨ−10,ijψ0,ij)∫
exp
(
− 1
2
[
− 2
(
ψ′0,ijΨ
−1
0,ij +
∑
k|zk≥0
y˜′kΣ
−1X˜k +
∑
k|zk<0
y˜′kX˜k
)
Ψ1,ijΨ
−1
1,ijψij
+ψ′ijΨ
−1
1,ijψij
])
dψij
= (2pi)−pij/2 |Ψ0,ij|−1/2 exp(−12ψ′0,ijΨ−10,ijψ0,ij)∫
exp
(
− 1
2
[
− 2ψ′1,ijΨ−11,ijψij +ψ′ijΨ−11,ijψij
])
dψij
= (2pi)−pij/2 |Ψ1,ij|−1/2 |Ψ1,ij|1/2 |Ψ0,ij|−1/2 exp(−12ψ′0,ijΨ−10,ijψ0,ij) exp(12ψ′1,ijΨ−11,ijψ1,ij)∫
exp
(
− 1
2
[
ψ′1,ijΨ
−1
1,ijψ1,ij − 2ψ′1,ijΨ−11,ijψij +ψ′ijΨ−11,ijψij
])
dψij
= |Ψ0,ij|−1/2 exp(−12ψ′0,ijΨ−10,ijψ0,ij) |Ψ1,ij|1/2 exp(12ψ′1,ijΨ−11,ijψ1,ij)

References
Albert, J. H. and Chib, S. (1993). Bayesian Analysis of Binary and Polychotomous Response
Data. Journal of the American Statistical Association, 88, No.422:669–679.
Altshuler, R., Grubert, H., and Newlon, T. S. (1988). Has U.S. Investment Abroad Become
More Sensitive to Tax Rates? NBER Working Paper, 11403.
Anderson, J. E. and van Wincoop, E. (2003). Gravity with Gravitas: A Solution to the
Border Puzzle. American Economic Review, 93, No.1:170–192.
22
Bergstrand, J. H. and Egger, P. (2007). A Knowledge-and-Physical-Capital Model of Inter-
national Trade Flows, Foreign Direct Investment, and Multinational Enterprises. Journal
of International Economics, 73:278–308.
Blonigen, B. A. (2005). A Review of the Empirical Literature on FDI Determinants. NBER
Working Paper, 11299.
Blonigen, B. A. and Davies, R. B. (2004). The Effects of Bilateral Tax Treaties on U.S. FDI
Activity. International Tax and Public Finance, 11, No. 5:601–622.
Blonigen, B. A., Davies, R. B., Waddell, G. R., and Naughton, H. T. (2007). FDI in Space:
Spatial Autoregressive Relationships in Foreign Direct Investment. European Economic
Review, 51, No. 5:1303–1325.
Chib, S. (2007). Analysis of Treatment Response Data without the Joint Distribution of
Potential Outcomes. Journal of Econometrics, 140, No. 2:410–412.
Dickey, J. M. and Gunel, E. (1978). Bayes factors from mixed probabilities. J. R. Statist.
Soc. B, 40:43–46.
Dunning, J. H. (1980). Towards an Eclectic Theory of International Production: Some
Empirical Tests. Journal of International Business Studies, 11, No. 1:9–31.
Eicher, T. S., Helfman, L., and Lenkoski, A. (2011). Robust FDI Determinants. Journal of
Macroeconomics, accepted.
Eicher, T. S. and Henn, C. (2011). One Money, One Market: A Revised Benchmark. Review
of International Economics, 19, No. 3:419–435.
Helpman, E. (1984). A Simple Theory of International Trade with Multinational Corpora-
tions. Journal of Political Economy, 92, No. 3:451–471.
Hoeting, J. A., Madigan, D., Raftery, A. E., and Volinsky, C. T. (1999). Bayesian Model
Averaging: A Tutorial. Statistical Science, 14 No.4:382–417.
23
ICRG (1985-2000). International Country Risk Guide Annual. PRS Group.
Karl, A. and Lenkoski, A. (2012). Instrumental variable Bayesian model averaging via
conditional Bayes factors. In submission, available at http://arxiv.org/abs/1202.5846.
Kass, R. E. and Raftery, A. E. (1995). Bayes factors. Journal of the American Statistical
Association, 90:773–795.
Madigan, D. and York, J. (1995). Bayesian graphical models for discrete data. International
Statistical Review, 63:215–232.
Markusen, J. R. (1984). Multinationals, Multi-Plant Economies, and the Gains from Trade.
Journal of International Economics, 16, No. 3-4:205–226.
Markusen, J. R. (1997). Trade versus Investment Liberalization. NBER Working Paper, No.
6231.
McCulloch, R. E., Polson, N. G., and Rossi, P. E. (2000). A Bayesian Analysis of the
Multinomial Probit Model with Fully Identified Parameters. Journal of Econometrics,
99:173–193.
Navaretti, G. B. and Venables, A. J. (2006). Multinational Firms in the World Economy.
Princeton University Press, Princeton.
Neumeyer, E. and Spess, L. (2005). Do Bilateral Investment Treaties Increase Foreign Direct
Investment to Developing Countries? World Development, 33, No. 10:1567–1585.
Omori, Y. (2007). Efficient Gibbs Sampler for Bayesian Analysis of a Sample Selection
Model. Statistics & Probability Letters, 77:1300–1311.
Raftery, A. E. (1995). Bayesian model selection in social research (with discussion). Socio-
logical Methodology, 25:111–196.
Razin, A., Sadka, E., and Tong, H. (2008). Bilateral FDI Flows: Threshold Barriers and
Productivity Shocks. CESifo Economic Studies, 54, No. 3:451–470.
24
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
mean sd min max Source
APECij 0.09 0.29 0 1 Eicher, Henn (2011)
BI RTAij 0.01 0.11 0 1 Eicher, Henn (2011)
BORDERij 0.04 0.19 0 1 Eicher, Henn (2011)
BUREAUi 3.15 0.95 0 4 International Country Risk Guide
BUREAUj 3.18 0.95 0 4 International Country Risk Guide
COLONYij 0.03 0.18 0 1 Eicher, Henn (2011)
COM LANGij 0.18 0.38 0 1 Razin, Sadka, Tong (2008)
CORRUPTi 4.23 1.32 1.08 6 International Country Risk Guide
CORRUPTj 4.25 1.33 1.08 6 International Country Risk Guide
DEMOCRATICi 4.9 1.25 1 6 International Country Risk Guide
DEMOCRATICj 4.96 1.21 1 6 International Country Risk Guide
DEVELOPMENTi 5.38 1.37 1.71 9.1 constructed from Razin, Sadka, Tong (2008)
DEVELOPMENTj 5.32 1.37 1.71 9.1 constructed from Razin, Sadka, Tong (2008)
DISTANCEij 8.24 0.92 4.92 9.42 Razin, Sadka, Tong (2008)
DOLLARij 0 0.04 0 1 Eicher, Henn (2011)
EDU DIFFij -0.06 3.22 -8.5 9.89 Razin, Sadka, Tong (2008)
EEAij 0.08 0.26 0 1 Eicher, Henn (2011)
EFTAij 0.01 0.09 0 1 Eicher, Henn (2011)
ETHNIC TENSIONi 4.82 1.27 1 6 International Country Risk Guide
ETHNIC TENSIONj 4.81 1.33 1 6 International Country Risk Guide
EUij 0.1 0.29 0 1 Eicher, Henn (2011)
EUROij 0.01 0.1 0 1 Eicher, Henn (2011)
EXTERN CONFLICTi 10.88 1.5 4.25 12 International Country Risk Guide
EXTERN CONFLICTj 10.86 1.59 4.25 12 International Country Risk Guide
FIN RISKi 39.83 7.28 18 50 Razin, Sadka, Tong (2008)
FIN RISKj 39.83 7.38 18 50 Razin, Sadka, Tong (2008)
GDP GROWTHi 0.04 0.04 -0.13 0.14 constructed from Razin, Sadka, Tong (2008)
GDP GROWTHj 0.04 0.05 -0.13 0.45 constructed from Razin, Sadka, Tong (2008)
GOV STABILITYi 7.61 2.02 1 12 International Country Risk Guide
GOV STABILITYj 7.57 2.04 1 11 International Country Risk Guide
INTERN CONFLICTi 10.06 2.21 3 12 International Country Risk Guide
INTERN CONFLICTj 10.02 2.28 3 12 International Country Risk Guide
INV PROFi 6.97 1.73 2.33 11.17 International Country Risk Guide
INV PROFj 6.97 1.74 2.42 11.17 International Country Risk Guide
INVEST TREATYij 0.12 0.32 0 1 Neumayer, Spess (2005)
LAIAij 0.02 0.15 0 1 Eicher, Henn (2011)
LAW ORDERi 4.71 1.4 1 6 International Country Risk Guide
LAW ORDERj 4.71 1.44 1 6 International Country Risk Guide
LOG FDI 1.27 2.26 -2.85 11.14 Razin, Sadka, Tong (2008)
MILITARYi 4.82 1.5 1 6 International Country Risk Guide
MILITARYj 4.85 1.52 0 6 International Country Risk Guide
MRKT POTENTIALj 0.57 0.2 0.34 1.42 constructed see Blonigen et al., 2007)
MRKT SIZEi 9.17 1.17 5.81 10.75 Razin, Sadka, Tong (2008)
MRKT SIZEj 9.24 1.1 6.06 10.75 Razin, Sadka, Tong (2008)
NAFTAij 0 0.06 0 1 Eicher, Henn (2011)
NEG FDI LAG 0.05 0.22 0 1 constructed from Razin, Sadka, Tong (2008)
PAST FDI 0.34 0.47 0 1 Razin, Sadka, Tong (2008)
PRODUCTIVITYi 36.32 18.44 2.67 74.66 Razin, Sadka, Tong (2008)
PRODUCTIVITYj 37.25 18 4.24 74.66 Razin, Sadka, Tong (2008)
RELIGIOUS TENSIONi 5.2 1.07 1 6 International Country Risk Guide
RELIGIOUS TENSIONj 5.14 1.16 1 6 International Country Risk Guide
RERij 103.51 31.55 16.73 597.64 USDA http://www.ers.usda.gov
SOCIO ECONi 6.66 1.64 2 11 International Country Risk Guide
SOCIO ECONj 6.68 1.65 2 11 International Country Risk Guide
TAXi 0.22 0.11 0 0.73 1980-92: Altshulter et al. (1998)
TAXj 0.23 0.11 0 0.73 1994-02: IRS/SOI, World Tax Database
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Table 2: FDI Determinants and their Estimated Effects in the Past
Variable Name
Estimated Effect
Variable Description
+ none -
Gravity
DISTANCEij 1 16 natural log of bilateral distance
MRKT SIZEi 8 2 source natural log of real GDP
MRKT SIZEj 13 5 2 host natural log of real GDP
Geography/History
BORDERij 2 3 =1 if pair share a common border
COLONYij 4 2 =1 if pair share colonial relationship
COM LANGij 10 3 =1 if pair share common language
Factor Endowment
DEVELOPMENTi 3 4 source natural log of real GDP per capita
DEVELOPMENTj 7 7 host natural log of real GDP per capita
EDU DIFFij 2 4 2 source minus host education level
Growth & Productivity
GDP GROWTHi source GDP growth rate
GDP GROWTHj 2 3 host GDP growth rate
MRKT POTENTIALj 1 1
sum of host’s distance-weighted GDP
to all other countries
PRODUCTIVITYi 1 1 1 source productivity (real GDP per worker)
PRODUCTIVITYj 1 1 host productivity (real GDP per worker)
Fiscal / Monetary Policy
TAXi 1 source effective corporate tax rate
TAXj 3 5 host effective corporate tax rate
RERij 4 2 real exchange rate (host/source currency)
RTAs / CUs /
Investment
INVEST TREATYij 1 3
=1 if both countries are in a treaty
RTAij 0 0 0
BI RTAij 1 3 1
NAFTAij 1 3 1
EUij 1 3
EFTAij 1 1
EEAij
LAIAij
APECij 1 2
EUROij
DOLLARij
Economic Risk
BUREAUi source bureaucratic quality
BUREAUj 2 host bureaucratic quality
CORRUPTi source corruption
CORRUPTj 3 2 host corruption
FIN RISKi 1 2 2 source financial risk
FIN RISKj 2 2 host financial risk
Political Risk
DEMOCRATICi source democratic accountability
DEMOCRATICj 1 host democratic accountability
ETHNIC TENSIONi source ethnic tensions
ETHNIC TENSIONj 1 host ethnic tensions
EXTERN CONFLICTi source external conflict
EXTERN CONFLICTj 1 host external conflict
GOV STABILITYi source government stability
GOV STABILITYj 2 host government stability
INTERN CONFLICTi source internal conflict
INTERN CONFLICTj 1 host internal conflict
INV PROFILEi source investment profile
INV PROFILEj 2 host investment profile
LAW ORDERi 1 source law and order
LAW ORDERj 2 1 host law and order
MILITARYi source military in politics
MILITARYj 1 host military in politics
RELIGIOUS TENSIONi source religious tensions
RELIGIOUS TENSIONj 1 host religious tensions
SOCIO ECONi source socioeconomic conditions
SOCIO ECONj 1 host socioeconomic conditions
source: Eicher et al. (2011)
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Table 3: TBMA estimates for FDI determinants
FDI selection FDI flow
incl.prob post.mean post.sdev incl.prob post.mean post.sdev
APECij 0.19 0.14 0.06 1.00 0.87 0.09
COLONYij 1.00 0.44 0.10 1.00 1.11 0.11
COM LANGij 0.12 0.09 0.05 1.00 0.62 0.07
CORRUPTi 1.00 0.10 0.02 1.00 0.26 0.04
CORRUPTj 0.59 0.07 0.02 1.00 0.17 0.03
DEVELOPMENTi 1.00 0.28 0.02 1.00 0.94 0.03
DEVELOPMENTj 1.00 0.28 0.02 1.00 0.80 0.03
DISTANCEij 1.00 -0.32 0.03 1.00 -0.76 0.03
DOLLARij 0.31 -0.56 0.35 1.00 4.00 0.71
ETHNIC TENSIONi 0.61 0.05 0.02 1.00 0.17 0.03
INTERN CONFLICTi 0.00 -0.01 0.01 1.00 -0.16 0.02
MRKT POTENTIALj 0.37 0.21 0.09 1.00 -0.92 0.12
MRKT SIZEi 0.41 0.10 0.03 1.00 0.39 0.08
MRKT SIZEj 1.00 -0.34 0.06 1.00 -1.30 0.07
PAST FDI 1.00 2.24 0.04 1.00 1.11 0.14
PRODUCTIVITYj 0.71 0.01 0.00 1.00 0.04 0.00
RELIGIOUS TENSIONj 0.95 0.09 0.02 1.00 0.38 0.03
SOCIO ECONj 0.01 0.01 0.01 1.00 0.08 0.02
TAXi 0.81 -0.55 0.18 1.00 -3.42 0.26
TAXj 0.99 -0.84 0.18 1.00 -4.36 0.26
BUREAUi 0.02 0.05 0.03 1.00 0.33 0.07
SOCIO ECONi 0.78 0.05 0.01 1.00 0.12 0.02
GDP GROWTHj 0.11 0.29 0.39 0.96 2.01 0.64
INTERN CONFLICTj 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.92 0.08 0.02
LAIAij 0.46 -0.34 0.14 0.90 -0.89 0.29
EXTERN CONFLICTj 0.03 -0.03 0.01 0.86 -0.08 0.02
EEAij 0.05 -0.07 0.09 0.82 -0.26 0.08
PRODUCTIVITYi 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.78 0.01 0.00
BI RTAij 0.44 0.32 0.13 0.33 0.37 0.19
GDP GROWTHi 0.39 -0.85 0.56 0.32 -0.85 0.89
DEMOCRATICi 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.26 0.10 0.04
MILITARYj 0.14 0.06 0.02 0.26 0.11 0.04
NEG FDI LAG 1.00 0.82 0.08 0.20 -0.16 0.07
NAFTAij 0.09 0.09 0.36 0.12 0.27 0.26
BUREAUj 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.11 0.12 0.06
EFTAij 0.34 0.39 0.19 0.08 -0.17 0.17
LAW ORDERi 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.06 -0.07 0.04
EUROij 0.05 -0.02 0.17 0.06 -0.06 0.18
INVEST TREATYij 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.08
INV PROFi 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.02
EUij 0.32 -0.17 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.11
BORDERij 1.00 -0.73 0.11 0.04 0.04 0.12
INV PROFj 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.02
MILITARYi 0.64 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04
EXTERN CONFLICTi 1.00 -0.08 0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.02
LAW ORDERj 0.52 0.08 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04
DEMOCRATICj 0.00 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.04
RERij 0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.00 0.00
ETHNIC TENSIONj 0.09 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03
GOV STABILITYi 0.00 -0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
RELIGIOUS TENSIONi 0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.04
GOV STABILITYj 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
EDU DIFFij 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 -0.00 0.01
FIN RISKj 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
FIN RISKi 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
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